It does seem onesto show, as the objector says, that identity is logically prior to ordinary similarity relationsReply: This is a good objection. However, the difference between first-order and higher-order relations is relevant here. Traditionally, similarity relations such as quantita and y are the same color have been represented, per the way indicated con the objection, as higher-order relations involving identities between higher order objects (properties). Yet this treatment may not be inevitable. Sopra Deutsch (1997), an attempt is made sicuro treat similarity relations of the form ‘\(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\)’ (where \(F\) is adjectival) as primitive, first-order, purely logical relations (see also Williamson 1988). If successful, a first-order treatment of similarity would spettacolo that the impression that identity is prior puro equivalence is merely a misimpression – paio onesto the assumption that the usual higher-order account of similarity relations is the only option.
Objection 6: If on day 3, \(c’ = s_2\), as the text asserts, then by NI, the same is true on day 2. But the text also asserts that on day 2, \(c = s_2\); yet \(c \ne c’\). This is incoherent.
Objection 7: The notion of relative identity is incoherent: “If verso cat and one of its proper parts are one and the same cat, what is the mass of that one cat?” (Burke 1994)
Reply: Young Oscar and Old Oscar are the same dog, but it makes per niente sense puro ask: “What is the mass of that one dog.” Given the possibility of change, identical objects may differ per mass. On the correlative identity account, that means that distinct logical objects that are the same \(F\) may differ con mass – and may differ with respect esatto a host of other properties as well. Fortsett å lese It does seem onesto show, as the objector says, that identity is logically prior to ordinary similarity relations
